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A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR THE NON-PERFORMING LOANS IN THE 
PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM  
 




This paper aims to propose a solution for the current problem of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) 
in the Portuguese banking system. The analysis starts with an overview of the theoretical 
responses to an overall NPL problem. This is followed by a description of the relevant events 
in the last decade within the Portuguese banking system and of the solution currently being 
studied by the Portuguese government. The paper concludes that the solution has severe flaws, 
and proposes an alternative solution that consists on a centralized asset management company. 





The deterioration of the performance of the exposures on banks’ balance sheets has proven to 
have a significant impact on both the banking system and the overall economy. Currently, this 
problem is affecting some European countries, including Portugal. Therefore, there is an urgent 
need for measures that efficiently tackle this problem.  
This paper aims to analyze both recent relevant events in the Portuguese banking system and 
possible solutions to the problem and, according to the results of that analysis, to present the 
solution that best suits the problem in Portugal. 
2. Literature Review: Possible Responses to the NPL Problem 
A Non-Performing Loan (NPL) is a loan that is not earning any income, for one or more of 
three reasons: the full payment of the principal and interest is no longer expected; the principal 
or interest payments are in arrears for 90 or more days; or the maturity date has already passed 
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and the full payment has not been made (Hou and Dickinson, 2007). The fact that a loan is not 
performing is an indicator of a debtor’s inability (or unwillingness) to pay, given that problem 
loans increase as a result of firm’s and households’ financial distress. 
Any policy response to a high NPL level involves decisions regarding the distribution of the 
incurred losses and costs across stakeholders over time. The policy should aim for a least-cost 
solution in the long term, maximizing the Net Present Value (NPV) of the NPLs, even if that 
involves incurring significant losses in the short-term. However, policymakers should also 
avoid triggering a fire sale, as it could result in unnecessary damage to the banking system. 
Hence, the timely resolution of NPLs should also be under scrutiny by the competent 
authorities, which is in line with the current micro and macroprudential policies within the 
European Union (EU).  
According to the European Systemic Risk Board (2017), there are five main principles that 
should guide an NPL policy response: both the recognition and action should be swift, avoiding 
fire sales; losses should be borne primarily by shareholders and other investors, to avoid moral 
hazard incentives; all parties involved must comply with the EU legal framework; the response 
should include a long-term viability assessment on all the affected banks; and the problem 
should be addressed through a comprehensive package. 
Although the aim of a public intervention during an NPL crisis is to minimize the inefficiencies 
associated with the resolution of the problem, the governmental intervention also implies some 
distortions, which must not exceed the benefits of said intervention (Claessens et al, 2014). 
Furthermore, state aid is now much stricter rules, enforced by the European Commission (EC) 
and other European authorities. For example, if a bank receives any type of state aid, it 
necessarily has to go through a restructuring process. Additionally, burden sharing is required, 
which implies that shareholders and junior bondholders have to fully absorb the bank losses 
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before state aid is triggered (Economic Governance Support Unit of the European Parliament, 
2016; Laeven and Laryea, 2009). 
Any NPL resolution program should be implemented at a certain pace that is neither too slow 
nor too fast, as both have some severe consequences. On one hand, if the NPL resolution is 
done too slowly, it could result in the misallocation of resources, as banks incur in zombie 
lending practices, as well as in a decrease in the creation of new loans and a delay in credit 
recovery. It also implies the prolongation of the elevated funding costs, as well as the further 
deterioration of the viability of distressed debtors. On the other hand, if the NPL resolution is 
done too rapidly, it could result in unnecessary fire sales, having an adverse impact on the 
remaining NPLs, as well as in an increase of banks’ capital costs through the new loss-given-
default (LGD) on both the performing loans and the new exposures. It also implies the 
liquidation of possibly viable entities, as well as an increase in the pressure of the country’s 
social safety net. 
A country that is suffering from a high NPL volume can try to handle the problem using two 
different approaches: the active approach, which tries to decrease the overall NPL value, and 
the passive approach, which tries to increase the total credit available in the economy, reducing 
the NPL ratio through its denominator (Bolgova, Nies and Plekhanov, 2016). 
According to Bolgova, Nies and Plekhanov (2016), passive episodes tend to start with a lower 
debt-to-GDP ratio (28 percent versus 50 percent), and also with a lower income per capita 
($5,600 versus $6,700). This reflects the fact that countries with a low credit-to-GDP ratio 
benefit more easily from a credit boom, which passively resolves the NPL problem. However, 
the danger that a passive approach turns into a “wait-and-see” approach should not be 
dismissed. A “wait-and-see” approach is a dangerous approach, as it could cast even more doubt 
over the banking system and its stability, tampering with investor confidence and damaging the 
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real economy. Furthermore, ignoring the existing problems within the banking system in the 
interest of sustaining the credit levels will, on average, lead to a more severe contraction of 
credit at a later stage (European Systemic Risk Board, 2017). Policymakers can prevent this 
type of approach through high levels of supervision. 
On the other hand, an active approach consists of the sufficient capitalization of banks so that 
they can create provisions regarding NPL exposures. Once banks are recapitalized, their loss-
absorbing capacity is boosted, allowing them to sustain further write-offs and Loan Loss 
Provisions (LLPs). An active approach is usually associated with some short-term costs for the 
governments (Bolgova, Nies and Plekhanov, 2016; Demertzis and Lehmann, 2017). 
Additionally, authorities should ensure the necessary conditions for banks to be able to write-
off and sell these assets, such as adequate administrative and legal regimes, such an insolvency 
regime. An insolvency regime aims to help in the restructuring of corporate debt, and it is 
especially important in a downturn phase of the economic cycle, as there are a large number of 
firm bankruptcies. If the insolvency regime in place has structural inefficiencies, it will not 
allow for a timely resolution all bankruptcies through the conventional court system. Therefore, 
there is the need for an organized strategy that has to be able to support each individualized 
restructuring process and to promote a large-scale voluntary work-out between creditors and 
debtors. Inside this mechanism, groups of creditors would organize solutions for the firms in 
default, cooperating under the guidance of a lead bank to restructure said firms. The majority 
of the creditors would have to agree on a restructuring plan that binds all creditors and then 
implement it (Demertzis and Lehmann, 2017; De Haas and Knobloch, 2010; European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, 2010). To be reasonably effective, an insolvency regime 
has to include a few specific characteristics. First, creditors should have an automatic priority 
position regarding any payments that the debtors may make during the restructuring process. 
Second, if there is any devaluation of the loan collateral, the difference between its value and 
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the outstanding value of the loan should be treated as an unsecured loan for restructuring 
purposes. Third, the restructuring of debt, either in terms of principal repayment, interest 
payments, and maturity date should be sone taking into account the debtor’s real future ability 
to pay These three tools can be combined in a way that incentives both borrowers and lenders 
to engage in the restructuring plan. Lastly, the restructuring should end when the debtors are 
both viable and free from unsustainable debt (Laeven and Laryea, 2009). SMEs are the most 
affected by a complex and inefficient legal framework, as a properly functioning system helps 
them to reach an agreement with their creditors without the need of court intervention, allowing 
sound firms in distress to continue operating and avoiding unnecessary company failures due 
to their debt burden. Additionally, the government could further incentive these voluntary 
proceedings by supporting a set of nonbinding restructuring guidelines. However, structural 
reforms such as this one take time to be implemented, which does not contribute to the 
confidence of investors in them. Overall, a proper reform of the legal framework of insolvencies 
is proven to result in both higher recovery rates and in accelerated cash-flows. On one hand, 
higher recovery rates arise due to an increase in transparency and a decrease in the overall costs 
regarding the processes of repossession and auction of collateral. On the other hand, faster cash-
flows arise from a shortening of both in-court and out-of-court procedures (Fell, Moldovan and 
O Brien, 2017). 
The following step in an active approach is the design of a debt restructuring plan. The first 
thing to do in a debt restructuring plan, regardless of its form, is to subject the NPLs of the 
concerned banks to proper valuation and triage, in order to identify the viable exposures to be 
restructured, and the non-viable exposures to be liquidated (European Systemic Risk Board, 
2017). Furthermore, the corresponding LLP have to be properly registered in the banks’ balance 
sheets. If this is done with credibility, it will partially restore the market confidence. However, 
banks may not voluntarily do enough to resolve this problem, and there are many tools that the 
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government and the regulators can use to induce banks into making an extra effort. For example, 
they could set deadlines for banks to dispose of their problem loans, or even set a target value 
for each bank’s LLPs so that their individual capital buffers are optimally used (Bolgova, Nies 
and Plekhanov, 2016). Governments could additionally offer a tax break on loan write-offs, 
which could persuade banks to deal with their NPLs sooner (De Haas and Knobloch, 2010). 
All the policies previously described are common to all processes of debt restructuring, either 
decentralized, semi-centralized or centralized. The difference between these three is the 
mechanism each one uses to manage the bad quality assets and dispose of them (De Haas and 
Knobloch, 2010). 
In a decentralized approach, both the ownership and the management of bad assets remain in 
the original bank. Banks which suffer from high NPL levels can design their own strategies 
which, according to the Economic Governance Support Unit of the European Parliament 
(2016), have to be both ambitious and realistic, and have to include credible NPL reduction 
targets. These strategies can include internal workout and portfolio sales, which should be 
accompanied by a new operational plan for the bank (Demertzis and Lehmann, 2017; De Haas 
and Knobloch, 2010). One of the benefits of this approach is the fact that banks have specific 
knowledge on each of their debtors, which allows them to better decide on the optimal strategy 
for each individual debt restructuring plan, having even the possibility to retain customers 
through this plans. Furthermore, forcing bank managers to deal with this problem directly might 
have a positive effect on their risk-taking behavior. The adoption of a decentralized approach 
is only possible if the amount of NPLs within the baking system is limited to a certain threshold. 
If there is a widespread debt problem that affects the banking system’s stability the management 
of bad assets cannot be exclusive of the original banks. Moreover, if there are too many cases 
of foreclosures that involve the sale of collateral, an uncoordinated approach will plunge the 
prices of the assets used as collateral, namely housing prices, which calls for a more centralized 
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approach. The main disadvantage of an internal management of bad loans is the fact that bank 
LLPs will not suffer an immediate reduction, continuing to weigh on the bank’s balance sheet 
(De Haas and Knobloch, 2010; Crociata, 2016; European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2010). 
In a semi-centralized approach, large banks with a high NPL problem set up, for example, their 
own bad bank in order to deal with their bad assets. These are formally Asset Management 
Companies (AMCs), which isolate the illiquid and risky assets of a bank or group of banks. 
When an AMC is set up, it Is used to take over the bad assets on the bank’s balance sheet. This 
transfer is done at a discount on the assets’ value, and the gap it leaves in the bank’s balance 
sheet is filled with either public or private capital injections. In a semi-centralized approach, 
the AMCs created are private and are especially used by large banks, given that those are in a 
better position to establish an AMC on their own. This facilitates a better valuation of credit 
quality and NPL value, as well as better credit discipline. Another advantage of an AMC is that 
it allows the bank to solely focus on its new lending, while the management of impaired assets 
is done by a different entity. In this scenario, shareholders take significant losses (De Haas and 
Knobloch, 2010; Aiyar et al, 2015). An AMC should be complemented with other NPL 
resolution strategies. 
A semi-centralized AMC was put in place in Italy in 2016: the Atlanta Fund. The Atlanta Fund 
was an alternative investment fund created in April 2016, and its main objective was to structure 
private bail-in solutions. It started with a total capital of €4.25 billion, provided by the majority 
of Italian financial institutions. It is constituted by 67 banking institutions and none of which 
owns more than 20 percent of the fund’s equity. Its expected Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is 6 
percent, it has a time horizon of 5 years with the possibility of extension to 8 years, and is 
externally managed by Quaestio Capital Management. The fund underwrote new 
recapitalization for the Italian banks in need, using 70 percent of its initial capital, acquiring the 
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unsold shares in the market instead of the banks themselves. The fund also purchased the junior 
tranches of securitized NPL portfolios, using 30 percent of its initial capital. This allowed banks 
to issue new capital and at the same time partially clean up their NPL stock. As a consequence, 
the fund is expected to enhance the credibility of the Italian loan market, encouraging foreign 
investment and reducing the market’s bid-ask spread. However, this fund has some 
shortcomings. Its first weakness is the amount of capital that is available, which is significantly 
insufficient for the size and number of recapitalizations needed. Furthermore, this mechanism 
has the stronger financial institutions support the weaker ones. Theoretically, the stronger ones 
would then benefit from a sounder banking system and from more confidence by the investors; 
however, this may not actually happen as rating analysts expect the financial profile of the 
stronger banks to deteriorate. Finally, the fund has the Italian financial institutions as both 
shareholders and contracting parties, which not only represents a wide conflict of interests but 
also impairs market efficiency. In spite of its flaws, the fund was able to partially restrain the 
financial instability in the short run. For example, in May 2016, it acquired BP Vicenza, given 
that the bank’s call for investors had only amounted to 10 percent of the required capital. This 
intervention amounted to €1.5 billion and prevented the bank from entering into a resolution 
program. The fund also acquired Veneto Banca for €1 billion. Regarding the purchase of NPL 
portfolios, the MPS was one of the banks that benefited the most, transferring €27.7 billion in 
NPL stock to a securitization vehicle within the fund. Simultaneously, the bank raised €5 billion 
in capital from private investors, which increased its CET1 ratio to 13 percent without the need 
for any losses for both bondholders and depositors. The fund has a second capital increase in 
August 2016, which amounted to €1.715 billion to be used for the purchase of NPL portfolios 
(Messori, 2016; Crociata, 2016; Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance, 2016). 
Finally, a centralized approach consists of a highly centralized and public system-wide AMC. 
This type of centralized asset management firm benefits from an economy of scale, since it is 
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able to consolidate similar categories of assets and securitize them, which translates into a 
higher negotiating power against prospect buyers. If individual banks tried to negotiate, the 
leverage of the buyers would be significantly higher, increasing the discount on the assets’ 
prices. Furthermore, an economy of scale may reduce the fixed costs of asset resolution, as well 
as increase the efficiency of asset recovery. Therefore, a system-wide AMC has a significant 
positive impact on small banks. Moreover, it also establishes a uniform valuation principle and 
ensures proper loan documentation, which is an advantage mainly when compared with the 
information asymmetries that occur when the banks themselves sell the loans to uninformed 
buyers. A system-wide AMC also shares some of the previously stated benefits of an individual 
and private AMC (De Haas and Knobloch, 2010; Aiyar et al, 2015). 
One example of a centralized AMC was the bad bank created by the Italian government in 
November 2015. At the time, there were four banks that had significative structural deficiencies 
and were in need of restructuring, which led the Italian government to create a bad bank to 
receive the NPLs of those banks. The transfer of the NPLs was done at 18 percent of its nominal 
value; their nominal value was €8.5 billion and they were transferred for €1.5 billion. During 
this process, four new banks were created, destroying the total value for previous shareholders 
and subordinated debt holders; on the other hand, senior bondholders were safe from any losses. 
The total amount of capital required was €3.6 billion, half of which was meant to absorb the 
losses of the bad bank, while the other half was meant to recapitalize the four newly created 
banks and will be recovered once the shares of these banks are put on the market for sale. The 
portion of the €3.6 billion that wasn’t covered by the total losses of shareholders and junior 
bondholders was underwritten by the Italian National Resolution Fund (Messori, 2016; Troiano 
and Fisher, 2015; Raptis, 2016). 
However, the best example of a system-wide AMC is SAREB, which was created in Spain in 
2016 with the intent of clearing the NPLs of the Spanish banking system, reducing the 
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uncertainty regarding the strength of banks’ balance sheets, as well as to boost their liquidity. 
The NPLs from the banks’ under restructuring were transferred to SAREB, allowing banks to 
fully concentrate on their main business. SAREB will then divest the portfolio of assets 
received, maximizing their recovery within the following 15 years. In return for the assets 
transferred, banks received bonds issued by SAREB and guaranteed by the Spanish state. This 
trade significantly improved banks’ liquidity, given that, while the transferred assets had no 
usable collateral value, the SAREB bonds can be used as collateral for repos by the Eurosystem 
or for liquidity management operations run by the Spanish treasure. The Spanish state has two 
main roles in the functioning of SAREB. On one hand, the government increases its liabilities 
due to the guarantee provided to SAREB bonds. On the other hand, through the FROB, which 
is the Spanish national resolution authority, the government also owns 45 percent of SAREB’s 
equity, which means that it absorbs part of its losses and receives part of its earnings. SAREB 
is able to receive three types of bad assets: foreclosed assets whose net carrying amount 
exceeded €100,000; loans to real estate developers whose net carrying amount exceeded 
€250,000, and controlling corporate holdings linked to real estate developers (European Central 
Bank, 2016). The transfer of these assets was compulsory for banks receiving any public capital 
injections. It had received initially 200,000 assets, which suffered a haircut of 53 percent when 
they were transferred, amounting to €50.8 billion. Currently, SAREB has approximately €200 
billion of real estate loans on its balance sheet, and its own funds represent 8 percent of its total 
asset volume (Economic Governance Support Unit of the European Parliament, 2016; Rubinoff, 
Fanti and Remedios, 2017; Lehmann, 2016; European Commission, 2012). 
Both semi.centralized and centralized approaches can prevent banks from becoming extremely 
risk-averse, improving the conditions for the supply of new credit. Moreover, a strategy which 
only involves the disposal of bad loans might not be sufficient to restore market confidence, 
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which implies that banks may not be able to raise new capital (De Haas and Knobloch, 2010; 
European Central Bank, 2016). 
Regardless of which approach is implemented for the management of NPLs, the portfolios have 
then to be disposed of by banks or government-sponsored agencies, usually through a sale in 
the loan market. In a sale, the NPL portfolios are transferred to investors, mainly investment 
banks, hedge funds and private equity firms, for a given price. This operation has an immediate 
positive impact on banks’ profits, due to the reduction of operating costs and the write-down of 
impaired loans, assuming that the loans had the correct amount of LLP already booked.  
A sale of NPLs in the market can be accompanied by an Asset Protection Scheme (APS), which 
is a mechanism that works as an insurance scheme on further losses on the impaired assets 
being transacted.  
The securitization of NPL portfolios constitutes an APS, and it is based on the tranching of the 
exposures being sold. By tranching the exposure, different investors with different purposes 
can acquire tranches with different maturities, risk levels and expected returns. For example, an 
investor in search of a high expected return rate has the possibility of only buying the junior 
tranche of the exposure, while an investor in search of a low-risk instrument has the possibility 
of buying only the senior tranche of the same exposure (European Central Bank, 2017). 
Therefore, securitization is a useful tool in boosting the NPL market, increasing the pool of 
investors interested in instruments of bad debt by appealing to more risk-averse investors. 
Furthermore, if an investor has the opportunity of only acquiring the tranche that best suits its 
interests, the price the investor is willing to pay is going to increase (Fell, Moldovan and O 
Brien, 2017). The main advantage of securitization for banks is that NPLs are more quickly 
derecognized from their balance sheets, as the activity on the loan market is expected to 
increase. However, in the EU context, banks do not have incentives to securitize their portfolios 
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of loans due to the strict EU regulation regarding this type of scheme. For example, it imposes 
high capital charges on banks, making the regulatory cost of securitizing the NPLs high relative 
to the cost of holding the NPLs on their balance sheet. Moreover, EU regulation also requires 
investors to incur on the appropriate amount of risk during the life of the transaction, which 
may not be in line with a securitization scheme (European Systemic Risk Board, 2017). 
To improve the efficacy of NPL securitization, governments can adopt a strategy of co-
investment, using either a Junior Guarantee on Securitization (JGS) or a Forward Purchase 
Scheme (FPS) (Fell, Moldovan and O Brien, 2010). 
A JGS represents the co-investment of the state and investors on the junior tranches of 
decomposed exposures. This strategy is structured as a total return swap: the state guarantees 
up to 50 percent of the investors’ losses on the junior tranches of the exposure, and in return is 
entitles to any returns exceeding the initial estimation. By co-investing, the state is exposed to 
as much risk as the private investors, providing confidence to the market. AJGS has some 
advantages. First, it is very flexible, as investors can choose which level of protection they want 
for their junior tranches (up to 50 percent). The investors’ return is then inversely proportional 
to the level of protection chosen. For example, if an investor requires a 50 percent guarantee, 
the expected yield for the investment will also decrease by approximately by half; if investors 
are only exposed to half the losses, they should only be entitled to half of the future earnings. 
Second, it opens the junior tranches’ market to more risk-averse investors, since it de-risks the 
exposures. Third, since the state’s exposure is the same as the investors’, these are confident 
that the state will work to avoid losses, providing them with an investment with an enhanced 
risk/return profile. Thus, this instruments sends a clear signal to the market that the state is 
deeply invested in resolving the issue of NPLs. Fourth, the state can put this mechanism in place 
without the need for initial investment, which is a clear benefit of this model. Finally, the 
government support to this type of financial structure helps boost the NPL sales through the 
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elimination of the asymmetry of information between sellers and buyers by giving investors a 
guarantee of performance in the form of a JGS. In conclusion, a co-investment strategy in the 
context of securitization is one of the best and most efficient tools for the NPL resolution 
through the direct sale of portfolios (Economic Governance Support Unit of the European 
Parliament, 2016; Fell, Moldovan and O Brien, 2017).  However, the EU may consider that, in 
a scheme such as this, the state is not appropriately remunerated by the risk it incurs in, and the 
burden-sharing principle is not respected, considering the scheme state aid. For example, the 
EU did not approve the mechanism in Italy when the Italian government was restructuring their 
pool of LSIs (Less Significant Institutions) (Messori, 2016). 
Instead of issuing a guarantee on the junior tranches of NPLs, the state can also issue a guarantee 
on the senior tranches, which are the least risky ones. This was done in Italy, through GACS 
(Garanzia Cartolarizzazione Sofferenze). This regime, which was open to all banks on a 
voluntary basis, allowed the Italian government to support NPL portfolios going into the 
market. It worked through the transfer of the NPL portfolios from the banks’ balance sheets 
into a private securitization vehicle (SPV) at a price up to their book value.The mechanism then 
issued  Asset-Backed Securities (ABSs), with the NPLs being used as the underlying assets, 
and then sold the ABSs in the market. This scheme only covered the interest and principal 
payments of the senior tranches of the NPL portfolios, and for this guarantee to be given both 
the mezzanine and the junior tranches have to be subordinated to the senior tranches. This was 
considered a budget neutral mechanism and therefore was not considered state aid, being 
accepted by the EC. GACS is expected to significantly reduce the bid-ask spread in the loan 
market from both ends: not only banks will be incentivized to dispose of their NPLs, but also 
investors will increase their demand due to the higher creditworthiness of the exposures on the 
market. It is also expected to lead the market to trade on more complex deals structures, 
including sub-performing and performing loans (Messori, 2016; Economic Governance 
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Support Unit of the European Parliament, 2016; Crociata, 2016; Italian Ministry of Economic 
and Finance, 2016; European Central Bank, 2016). 
Another tool the state has available is an FPS, which consists of a loan provided by the state to 
NPL buyers as a way to finance part of the price paid, and it is done at rates below the 
borrower’s cost of capital. At the time of the sale, the borrower agrees on the price that it will 
pay for the NPL. However, that price will only be paid once the exposure reaches its maturity; 
the price that is paid by the investor at the time of the sale is equal to the bid price of the market. 
Simultaneously, the government finances the purchase by paying at the time of the sale the 
difference between the forward agreed price and the bid price. Thus, the part of the price that 
is financed by the state corresponds to the difference between the price that the buyer is willing 
to pay in the future and the price it is willing to pay in the present. Once the NPL matures, the 
state is refunded by the buyer.This scheme helps to partially close the bid-ask spread, given that 
facing such low-cost financing, buyers are willing to pay a higher price for the NPLs in the 
future while still being able to achieve their target IRR. Therefore, an FPS allows for NPL 
transactions that would have never been completed without this incentive. Additionally, it also 
increases the pool of prospective buyers, which further increases the bid price. As in a JGS 
scheme, the state is also impacted if there is a loss on the investment, providing the market with 
a clear signal that it will work to prevent any losses from occurring (Fell, Moldovan and O 
Brien, 2017). 
During any kind of NPL resolution, whether in a debt restructuring program, an asset 
management process, or a sale of portfolios in the market, the national and European 
supervisors always have a role to play. For example, authorities should ensure that banks 
comply with the EU NPL regulation, as well as with the directives for prudent measurement 
and management of banks’ NPL stocks. Furthermore, according to the European Systemic Risk 
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Board (2017), the supervisors should design the blueprints for an AMC if they are deemed 
necessary. 
In addition to resolving the banking system’s NPL stocks, any mechanism chosen should 
simultaneously resolve the additional impediments that may impair its proper functioning. 
These impediments can come from three sources: the supply side (banks), from the demand 
side (prospect investors), and from structural issues (European Systemic Risk Board, 2017).  
A supply-side impediment translates into a weak incentive for banks to dispose of their NPLs 
due to low opportunity costs, mostly induced by accounting rules, tax issues and current capital 
constraints, and to a coordination issue that creates a first-mover disadvantage. The accounting 
standards (both IAS 39 and IFR9) allow banks to recognize interest income on NPLs. In the 
current low-interest environment, the interest income streams on NPLs are likely to be higher 
than the interest income streams on new sound loans, which increases the banks’ profits from 
a short-term perspective. Additionally, if provisions and write-offs are not immediately tax 
deductible, the incentives to recognize the losses in a timely manner and resolve NPLs is 
weakened, as the cost of NPL resolution increases. Finally, the first-mover disadvantage resides 
in the liquidity problem of a starting loan market. As long as the loan market remains illiquid, 
a bank that chooses to sell their NPLs would be faced with a large bid-ask spread, resulting in 
a low sale price. However, the first operation would make the market more liquid, benefiting 
the following banks. Therefore, no bank wants to be the first to perform their NPL sales 
(European Systemic Risk Board, 2017). 
The demand-side impediments reside mainly on the information asymmetry and licensing 
requirements of the loan market. Currently, European markets are suffering from a high 
concentration of potential buyers, mainly due to the existing barriers to entry for investors. This 
creates an oligopoly situation, with a significant power laying in the investors facing limited 
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competition. Additionally, loan markets are still very prone to the existence of information 
asymmetries, as well as uncertainty regarding the portfolios’ true value. This causes the market 
to be seen as a “market for lemons”, which results in a large bid-ask spread (European Systemic 
Risk Board). 
Finally, structural issues that may cause an impediment to NPL resolution mainly rely on the 
inefficiency, length, and cost of the debt recovery processes. These problems affect both sides 
of the market, creating a deadweight cost. If a country’s legal system and judicial proceedings 
are complex, the investment on portfolios of distressed debt is discouraged, as both the 
enforcement of the loan collateral and the outcome of the insolvency proceedings might be 
significantly lengthy, costly and even unpredictable (European systemic Risk Board, 2017). 
3. Methodology 
For this paper I adopted a qualitative methodology based on documentary analysis, in order to 
build an approach to the NPL problem in Portugal. The documentary analysis fell on academic 
papers regarding all aspects of NPLs and on various national and international reports on the 
Portuguese banking system. Finally, I drew my conclusions from the comparison of the reality 
of the Portuguese situation and the NPL theoretical framework. 
4. The Portuguese Financial Crisis and its Impact on NPL Levels 
By the end of the last decade, Portugal had several system-wide financial problems, which 
included the level of NPLs on the Portuguese banking system. 
In 2011, Banco Espírito Santo (BES), Millennium BCP and Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) 
created restructuring funds in an attempt to deal with their NPL problem. These funds were 
used to aggregate the credits owned by various banks on big companies that were defaulting; 
each fund was meant to a different activity sector. The exposures transferred were traded by a 
participation on each fund, which could not be higher than 20 percent in order to be considered 
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a financial investment and, therefore, allowing for the funds’ losses to not be considered on the 
banks’ profits or losses. The banks then amortize the losses on their financial participation over 
time, which means that they will not have to recognize the entire loss when the credit defaults. 
Furthermore, it was believed that the funds would manage the NPL portfolios better. Each fund 
is managed by a private equity firm. For example, ECS Capital Manages Fundo Albuquerque, 
Fundo Recuperação, and Fundo Recuperação Turismo. The fund Explorer Investments 
manages four funds: Explorer I, which was created in 2004 and manages €65 million; Explorer 
II, which was created in 2007 and manages €200 million; Explorer III, which was created in 
2009 and manages €135 million; and FRN, which was created in 2013 and manages €8 million. 
OxyCapital also manages four funds: Fundo de Reestruturação Empresarial, Fundo Aquarius, 
Fundo Recapitalização Centro, and Fundo Cometa. Finally, the private equity firm Vallis 
manages two funds: Vallis Sustainable Investments I, which was created in 2012 and manages 
€75 million, and Vallis Construction Sector Consolidation, which manages €30 million. Bank 
of Portugal, which is both the supervisory authority and the resolution authority in Portugal, 
required additional capital regarding these holdings, given the fact that the book value of the 
transferred assets might not have corresponded to their market value, and thus the value of the 
holding might represent a hidden loss, which means that a mark-to-market valuation would 
likely increase the capital needs of the banks. This was supposed to be a temporary solution; 
however, these funds still exist. 
In April 2011, Portugal sought assistance from international authorities, and in May 2011 
started the Assistance Programme (AP) supported by the EU, the ECB and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The program was funded by the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and the IMF, amounting 
to €78 billion.  
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One of the objectives of the program was the increase of the Portuguese banks’ CET1 ratio, 
which was, according to Bank of Portugal (2011), 8.7 percent at the start of the program. The 
aim was to increase it to 9 percent by the end of 2011 and to 10 percent by the end of 2012, 
maintaining it thereafter. Banks were also required to present by June 2011 a plan on which 
they state how they intend to comply with these requirements. The total funding available 
within the AP for this effect was €12 billion, but Portuguese banks only used €6 billion on their 
CET1 raising efforts. The program also featured a series of special on-site inspections that 
aimed to validate the data that banks provided regarding their assets for the solvency 
assessments. 
Apart from the AP’s funds (€78 billion), there was also made available a fully-funded back-
stop facility for Portuguese banks amounting to €35 billion. This mechanism was meant to solve 
any liquidity problems arising in Portuguese banks, providing funding in the event of their 
ratings being downgraded below investment grade and, therefore, losing their access to both 
capital markets and the interbank lending market. During the crisis years, there were, in fact, 
significant downgradings of Portugal’s and its banks’ ratings, which led 6 banks to use the 
back-stop facility. However, out of the €35 billion, only €16.53 billion was used. This had 
mainly two explanations: on one hand, the period on which Portuguese banks lost their access 
to the interbank lending market was relatively short, to which contributed the fact that the 
Portuguese government extended their guarantees on bank bonds in order for them to be used 
as collateral in the European interbank lending market. On the other hand, Portuguese banks 
could also borrow funds from the ECB, mechanism which was highly used during this period. 
The borrowing from the ECB increased from €10.21 billion in December 2008 to €60 billion 
in June 2012. The dependence of Portuguese banks on ECB funding raised some concerns, 
which led European authorities to impose mandatory quarterly updates of the banks’ capital 
and funding plans. 
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In the course of the AP, both the international authorities and the Bank of Portugal instructed 
banks to reduce their loan-to-deposit ratios, which were, on average, 140.2 percent by the end 
of 2011. The imposed target was for the eight largest banking groups in Portugal to reduce their 
loan-to-deposit ratio to 120 percent by the end of 2014, according to the Portuguese Banking 
Association (2015). These directives were followed by the Portuguese banking system, which 
even performed better than expected: by the end of 2014, the loan-to-deposit ratio was 107.1 
percent. 
During the AP, Bank of Portugal also performed four assessments of the Portuguese banking 
system, in order to compute the total amount of impairments needed. The first assessment was 
done in 2011, when the AP began, and it uncovered a need of impairments that amounts to €596 
million; the second one was done in the second half of 2012, and it uncovered an additional 
need of €474 in impairments; the third one was done in June and July 2013 and it uncovered an 
additional need of €1.1 billion; and finally, the fourth assessment was done between October 
2013 and March 2014, and it uncovered an additional need for impairments of €1 billion. These 
assessments were binging, meaning that the exact amount of additional need of impairments 
for each individual bank had to be met.  
The AP also included a mandatory sale of Banco Português de Negócios (BPN). BPN was a 
Portuguese bank that was, in 2008, in a state of near bankruptcy. The bank was seen by the 
market as a non-compliant institution, but, in spite of its difficulties, it had benefited from an 
apparent complacency by the Bank of Portugal. Later that year, it was nationalized, as the 
government feared that its failure could disturb the Portuguese banking system. The plan to sell 
BPN contained in the AP did not set a minimum price, but it imposed an accelerated schedule. 
In 2014, Portugal, as well as all other countries in the euro-area, went through the 
Comprehensive Assessment, which was composed by an Asset Quality Review (AQR) and 
21 
 
some stress-testing exercises. The comprehensive assessment was initially performed on four 
Portuguese banking groups: CGD, Millennium BCP, Banco Português de Investimentos (BPI) 
and BES. However, since BES had to go through a resolution while the assessment was still 
ongoing, the bank was removed from it. Both CGD and BPI passed the assessment, but 
Millennium BCP failed it. Nevertheless, Bank of Portugal declared that the bank had already 
defined a set of measures to deal with its capital shortfalls, and would therefore not need 
additional measures once the previous ones were fully adopted. 
Between 2012 and 2014, the Portuguese government performed some capital injections on 
some Portuguese banks, which were mainly made through the issuance of new shares and 
hybrid capital instruments, such as CoCos, which are state-sponsored convertible bonds eligible 
for CET1 purposes. When the bank is in need of funding, it can issue CoCos that will be 
subscribed by the state. If at maturity the bank is able to repay, the state collects the payment 
and no longer has a claim on the bank. If on the other hand, the bank is unable to repay at 
maturity, the government converts the bonds into capital instruments and becomes a 
shareholder of the bank. 
In June 2012, there was a public injection of capital on CGD, which totaled €1,650 million. 
This state aid was performed through two mechanisms: the issuance of 150 million new shares, 
amounting to €750 million, and the issuance of CoCoc amounting to €900 million. Both these 
instruments were entirely subscribed by the Portuguese state. On January 2017, the CoCos 
matured. Instead of repaying the bonds, CGD and the Portuguese state agreed that the bonds 
would be converted in order to perform a capital increase for the same amount (€900 million). 
However, the estimated capital needs for CGD totaled €3.9 billion, which led to additional 
measures, such as the transfer of the state’s stake in CGD’s subsidiary Percaixa to CGD in 
January 2017. The state-owned 49 percent of Percaixa’s capital, which amounted to €500 
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million. The remaining €2.5 billion will be injected into CGD through the issuance of new 
shares, on a date yet to be determined. 
Banif, which was an LSI operating on the Portuguese banking system, also benefited from a 
recapitalization plan, which amounted to €1.1 billion. This plan included a governmental capital 
injection through the issuance of new shares in 2012, in an operation that amounted to €700 
million, and the simultaneous issue of €400 million in CoCos. The plan also required the bank 
to raise €450 million in private capital. However, this public recapitalization plan was not 
approved by the European authorities, given that in their opinion the bank had failed to 
demonstrate sustainable economic viability. This unstable situation led to the cutting of Banif’s 
ECB funding in 2015, which meant that the bank was not able to repay the CoCos. It was then 
leaked to the press that the bank had to be resolved, which led to a bank run and, consequently, 
to an emergency support request by the bank. This request was denied, and the resolution 
mechanism for the bank was activated. During the resolution process, the original bank was 
divided into three parts: the bad bank, an NPL managing platform called Oitante, and the good 
bank, which was composed by the branches, deposits and performing loans. The good bank was 
then sold to Santander for €150 million. The resolution process required state aid from the 
Portuguese state, which amounted to €2.255 billion, €1.766 billion from the Portuguese treasury 
and €489 million from Portugal’s resolution fund. 
Millennium BCP and BPI also issued CoCos, but in their case, the situation was very different. 
These banks issued, respectively, €3 billion and €1.5 billion in CoCos, which were repaid at 
maturity, extinguishing all state’s claims.  
BES was the third largest group operating in Portugal. In July 2014, the bank failed and had to 
go through a resolution process, which separated the bad bank from the good bank, the newly 
created Novo Banco. During this process, the Portuguese state also proceeded with an injection 
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of capital through the issuance of new shares of Novo Banco, in an operation that amounted to 
€3.9 billion.  
Portugal exited the AP on 17 May 2014 without the need for any type of precautionary 
measures. The Portuguese banking system has now 159 credit institutions, out of which 67 are 
banks, 88 are mutual agricultural credit banks, and 4 are savings banks. However, there are only 
4 SIS - CGD, Millennium BCP, Novo Banco, and BPI -, which represent 60 percent of the total 
Portuguese banking system. 
According to the Portuguese Banking Association (2015), the loans to customers of the non-
monetary sector decreased 5.5 percent between May 2011 and May 2015. However, the NPL 
ratio in December 2015 was still very high: 15 percent of total loans, which correspond to 
approximately €36.8 billion. This amount was generated during the long and deep financial 
crisis of the last decade in Portugal, but banks have yet to make serious advances to dismantle 
them. According to Deloitte (2017), Portuguese loan market activity only started in 2015, when 
€1.6 billion were traded. In 2016 the loan market activity amounted to €2.3 million divided by 
six banks: Santander, which presented a global deleveraging target of €1.5 billion for the year; 
Millennium BCP, which mostly sold secured portfolios throughout the year, but started to sell 
some secured ones in the last quarter of the year; Montepio, which securitized a portfolio sale 
during the first three quarters of 2016; Bankinter, which sold a mix of unsecured and secured 
portfolios on the second half of the year; BBVA, which sold a small amount of secured 
portfolios in the last quarter of the year; and finally Credito Agricola (CA), which sold a small 
amount of unsecured portfolios during the third quarter of the year. The expected activity on 
the market for 2017 is €2.1 billion. Portuguese banks are, therefore, taking their first steps in 
the loan market, selling mostly unsecured portfolios. These portfolios are highly or even fully 
provisioned due to the impairment adjustments required by the Bank of Portfolio, which means 
that the sale is going to generate an immediate profit for the banks.  
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5. An ACE as a Possible Solution 
The solution that the Portuguese government is currently exploring for the NPL problem in 
Portugal is an ACE (Acordo Complementar de Empresas, in English, Complementary 
Corporate Agreement), which is an agreement between two or more banks in order to deal with 
bad loans in the balance sheets of those same banks by creating an independent platform that 
would be responsible for the management, recovery and possible sale of the problem loans. 
This mechanism does not provide banks with an immediate cleaning of the balance sheets since 
the NPLs remain in the banks’ balance sheets, but it allows for a more efficient recovery of 
those assets under the management of the ACE.  
The Portuguese version of this mechanism is to be an entirely private model, including CGD, 
Millennium BCP, and Novo Banco, and to only manage corporate loans, whether the debtor is 
common to all banks or not. This restructuring will aim to perform a coordinated restructuring 
of the Portuguese corporate debt by the Portuguese banks, preventing companies which are 
overburdened with debt but are viable to go bankrupt and end up liquidated. Furthermore, ACE 
will not be an exclusive measure, meaning that it can be complemented by other measures 
deemed useful in the future. 
In spite of being created by CGD, Millennium BCP, and Novo Banco, other Portuguese banks 
will be able to join the ACE on a voluntary basis once the three original banks fill the platform 
with a number of loan portfolios large enough. The banks that join later will the benefit from 
the same condition of the three founding banks.  
In order to allow ACEto properly work, banks have to ensure enough capital to deal with 
imparities. CGD already had a capital increase through the conversion of CoCos, as previously 
explained. On the other hand, Millennium BCP increased its capital through a rights issue, 
which is an issuance of shares at special price to existing shareholders in proportion to their 
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holdings; the biggest capital injection was done by the Chinese group Fosun, which increased 
its position by €1.33 billion, and Sonangol also slightly subscribed to new shares. Finally, Novo 
Banco is completing its sale to the Lone Star fund, which includes a contingent capital 
mechanism. 
ACE seems to fall in the semi-centralized approach to the management of the banks’bad assets, 
given that the ownership of the loans remains on the bank side, but the management is done by 
an independent entity. However, this entity is controlled by those same banks, which means 
that the ACE is, in fact, a centralized approach, and it cannot be considered an AMC.  
The ACE will be partially funded by the Institutição Financeira de Desenvolvimento (IFD, in 
English Institution for the Financial Development), which was created with the mission to 
support mainly SMEs. In the ACE context, IFD will intervein by helping to recapitalize the 
financially degraded family, funding the companies deemed viable so that they do not have to 
increase their indebtedness to the banking system. Furthermore, if banks themselves were the 
ones to refinance these companies, their NPL levels would not decrease, since any new credit 
requested by companies that have already defaulted is automatically classified as NPLs. 
The competences of the IFD were recently widened to allow the financing of SMEs and mid-
cap companies, as well as the granting of loans through intermediary instruments such as on-
lending, which is an arrangement through which IFD borrows money from, for example, 
European authorities and lends it to Portuguese firms. The new by-laws also define that IFD no 
longer needs EC’s authorization to its support plans as long as the measures comprised in the 
plans comply with EU state aid regulation. 
Therefore, the intervention of IFD will not be a direct one. Once the banks within the ACE 
decide on which firms are the viable ones and on their corresponding restructuring plans, the 
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IFD steps in to help with the needed recapitalization processes. This will ensure the needed 
financing to the companies during the entire process. 
One of the main shortcomings of ACE is that it does not represent a systemic solution, as it 
starts with only three banks. This means that, if a firm has outstanding debt in banks both 
belonging and not belonging to the ACE, only a portion of its debt will be handled and 
restructured. Thus, a key component of the mechanism will not be successful. Furthermore, 
ACE is a very slow solution, as the NPLs remain in the banks’ balance sheets while they are 
being resolved. This increases the severity of the consequences present in an already slow NPL 
resolution. The misallocation of banks’ resources will likely persist, and banks will remain with 
high funding costs due to the perceived weakness of their balance sheets. Both these factors 
will not improve until the NPLs are disposed of by the banks, and the ACE does not establish 
any timeline for that. Lastly, the IFD role is too ambitious, in the manner that it does not have 
access to sufficient funding to deal with the entire volume of NPLs. Even if the IFD were to 
redistribute the whole amount of funds available for the ACE, not only that would not be enough 
to perform the number of restructurings needed, but would also mean stopping all SME’s 
support projects in order to make the whole funding available. 
6. A Different Solution 
The solution I propose for the Portuguese banking system NPL needs is a solution that is 
systemic from the start, that can rapidly free the banks’ balance sheets, and that does not rely 
on limited IFD funds. These three conditions can be met through the creation of a system-wide 
investment fund, similar to an improved version of the Atlanta Fund. 
The Atlanta Fund has already been previously described in this paper as an example of a 
centralized AMC. The fund has two functions: the main one is to recapitalize Italian banks, and 
the second one is to purchase NPL portfolios from those same banks and sell them on the 
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market. This AMC is supported by GACS, an APS that provides a state guarantee on the 
portfolios’ senior tranches. The fund has an expected IRR of 6 percent.  
The fund has had very good short-term results. According to Deloitte (2017), the combination 
of Atlanta and GACS contributed to the development of the Italian loan market, which is 
currently the most active in Europe: €3.7 billion in trades in 2014, €17.3 billion in 2015, €36 
billion in 2016, and an expected €52.8 billion in 2017. However, this fund has some 
shortcomings that cannot only impair its short-term results but also deteriorate its long-term 
viability. On one hand, the amount of capital available in the case of Atlanta was clearly not 
sufficient, and it could not be substantially increased due to the capital constraints of the 
contributing banks. On the other hand, the stronger banks were called to support the weaker 
banks, which lead to a decrease in their risk profile and not to an improvement on the whole 
banking system as some expected. Finally, the presence of banks as both the shareholders and 
the contracting parties of the fund represented a significant shortcoming of the fund, as it created 
a clear conflict of interests and also impaired market efficiency. If these shortcomings are 
overcome, a centralized private AMC is the best solution for a systemic NPL problem within a 
banking system. 
Therefore, the AMC I propose for the Portuguese case differs from the Atlanta Fund in a 
number of aspects. First of all, it should have its priorities reversed: as the Portuguese banks 
have already performed some capital increases, the majority of the AMC’s capital should be 
focused on the purchase of NPLs. Furthermore, Atlanta worked partially due to the acceptance 
by its shareholders (the banks) of an IRR of 6 percent. The only way that the Portuguese AMC 
would have to attract investors who accept such an IRR without making the same mistake as 
Atlanta is to search for a different type of investors. Typically, loan market investors search for 
an IRR of 15 to 20 percent, given that they tend to invest in the short-term. However, long-term 
investors such as pension funds and insurance companies are on the market for a lower IRR. 
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An IRR of 6 percent would significantly decrease the gap between the NPL’s book value and 
the value for which they are transferred to the fund, and consequently, the additional capital 
needs of the banks would be smaller. Nevertheless, banks still have some capital needs, as the 
gap gets smaller but does not disappear. These capital needs would also be met through the 
AMC, which could absorb financial instruments issued by the banks. The purchase of capital 
instruments by the fund would also allow investors to benefit from future bank profits, which 
would be partially created by the cleansing of the banking system. 
As seen before, the short-term success of the Atlanta Fund was partially due to the simultaneous 
implementation of GACS, which is an APS. Thus, an APS should also be implemented 
simultaneously. For the investors acquiring debt instruments from the fund, it could be 
implemented a state guarantee on some classes of debt notes. As the senior notes have priority 
over the other classes of notes, they are the least risky ones. We already know from the Italian 
experience that European authorities are more likely to approve APSs with the least possible 
risk for the state. Therefore, a state guarantee on the senior notes would be a suitable APS 
regarding debt instruments. For the investors acquiring equity instruments, a good choice would 
be to perform the APS through some type of fiscal credit over capital losses on the investment. 
Both these proposals for APSs have to be approved by European authorities before they can be 
implemented. 
Regarding the management of NPLs, the AMC’s structure would be a classic one. First, it would 
divide debtors and their correspondent exposures between viable and non-viable. The exposures 
of non-viable firms would then be liquidated and its collateral repossessed, while the exposures 
to viable debtors would be the target of a debt-restructuring plan, that could include debt 
extensions and/or debt-to-equity swaps. These management principles aim at maximizing the 
value of the total NPLs. 
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This solution clearly solves the shortcomings of the Atlanta Fund: banks are only the 
contracting party and not the shareholders, there are no pre-existing limits to the amount of 
capital that the AMC can arise among private investors, and the stronger banks do not have to 
deteriorate its risk profile by supporting weaker banks. A structure like this also has several 
advantages when compared with the ACE. First, it is a solution open to all banks of the system 
from the start, and therefore can be considered a real systemic solution. In addition, it provides 
a quick vehicle for banks to clean their balance sheets of NPLs, stopping almost immediately 
with the misallocation of resources and the high funding costs. Finally, and although the 
intervention by the state is needed for the APS, the fund is not directly dependent on 
government funding, which often represents slow processes and a large load of bureaucracy.  
Therefore, a centralized system-wide private AMC should be implemented in Portugal in order 
to systematically and definitively solve the NPL problem in the Portuguese banking system, as 
well as to prevent more NPL build-ups in the future. 
7. Conclusion 
My analysis suggests that a system-wide private AMC is the best solution for the Portuguese 
problem of NPLs, as it would allow for a systematic and definitive solution that prevents more 
NPL build-ups in the future. This solution should be discussed with the ECB and then 
implemented as soon as possible in order to prevent the extension of the consequences for the 
economy as a whole. 
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